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supply-chain

Hunt LLM supply-chain compromise (OWASP LLM03:2025) — malicious or backdoored models, datasets, adapters, plugins, MCP servers, and tokenizer / framework dependencies that ship inside an AI-integrated product.

62

Quality

73%

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/analyst/supply-chain/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Quality

Content

82%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.

A tight, highly actionable security-review skill body with executable inventory and PoC code and a solid validation contract. The main improvements are inline validation checkpoints in the audit workflow and moving some PoC detail into reference files for cleaner progressive disclosure.

Suggestions

Inline a brief validation checkpoint in the audit workflow (e.g. 'for each candidate artifact, run the validate_finding negative_command before reporting') so the feedback loop sits next to the steps rather than only in section 6.

Provide or generate the known-good.txt baseline referenced by the typo-squat PoC (or note that it must be supplied), so that snippet is copy-paste runnable end-to-end.

Consider splitting the PoC payloads (section 5) and the CVSS table (section 7) into a reference file so SKILL.md stays a lean overview with one-level-deep references.

DimensionReasoningScore

Conciseness

The body is lean and purposeful — terse recognition-signal bullets, compact attack-vector descriptions, and minimal code blocks with no padding or explanation of concepts Claude already knows; nearly every token earns its place.

5 / 5

Actionability

Mostly executable guidance: copy-pasteable grep -rE inventory commands and a runnable Python trigger-sweep cover the common cases, with minor gaps such as the typo-squat script depending on an unprovided known-good.txt and one PoC being procedural rather than code.

4 / 5

Workflow Clarity

The audit workflow is a clear sequenced set of inventory steps plus a per-artifact checklist, and a validate_finding contract (success/negative patterns) supplies the validation feedback loop this batch operation needs; the only gap is that validation lives in a separate section rather than inline at each checkpoint.

4 / 5

Progressive Disclosure

The ~140-line body is well organized into eight clearly headed, one-level sections with a properly signaled cross-skill reference; with no bundle files present everything is inline, so structure is good but nothing is split into reference files.

4 / 5

Total

17

/

20

Passed

Description

65%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Based on the skill's description, can an agent find and select it at the right time? Clear, specific descriptions lead to better discovery.

A specific, distinctive description with strong trigger keywords, weakened mainly by a single action verb and the absence of an explicit 'Use when...' clause. Adding explicit activation guidance and one or two more concrete verbs would lift completeness and specificity.

Suggestions

Add an explicit 'Use when...' clause naming the trigger situations (e.g. 'Use when reviewing an LLM-integrated product for supply-chain compromise, or when the user mentions malicious models, backdoored adapters, or unpinned LLM framework dependencies').

Add one or two more concrete action verbs beyond 'Hunt' (e.g. 'inventory', 'fingerprint', 'validate') to broaden the specificity of capabilities.

Include common file extensions or artifact tokens (e.g. .gguf, .safetensors, LoRA) in the description to round out trigger-term coverage.

DimensionReasoningScore

Specificity

The description names the domain comprehensively ('malicious or backdoored models, datasets, adapters, plugins, MCP servers, and tokenizer / framework dependencies') but offers only one concrete action verb ('Hunt'), so it names the domain and 1-2 actions without comprehensive action coverage.

3 / 5

Completeness

The 'what' is clear and concrete, but the description lacks any explicit 'Use when...' trigger clause; per the judging guidelines a missing explicit trigger guidance caps completeness at 3 even though a when is weakly implied by the OWASP reference.

3 / 5

Trigger Term Quality

Strong natural keyword coverage ('LLM supply-chain compromise', 'malicious', 'backdoored model', 'dataset', 'adapter', 'plugin', 'MCP', 'tokenizer', 'framework dependency', 'OWASP LLM03') that a reviewer would actually say, though a few natural variants and file extensions are missing.

4 / 5

Distinctiveness Conflict Risk

It carves a clear niche (LLM supply-chain compromise, OWASP LLM03) with distinct artifact-type triggers (models, LoRA adapters, MCP servers, tokenizers) and minimal overlap risk with other skills.

5 / 5

Total

15

/

20

Passed

Validation

93%

Checks the skill against the spec for correct structure and formatting. All validation checks must pass before discovery and implementation can be scored.

Validation15 / 16 Passed

Validation for skill structure

CriteriaDescriptionResult

metadata_version

'metadata.version' is missing

Warning

Total

15

/

16

Passed

Repository
PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
Reviewed

Table of Contents

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