Supply-chain attack category — dependency confusion, typosquatting, package-registry abuse, build-pipeline poisoning, SBOM manipulation.
66
80%
Does it follow best practices?
Run evals on this skill
Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
View guide
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
This is a routing skill for supply-chain attack research. Sub-skills cover specific techniques against the dependency, build, and distribution layers.
| Sub-Skill | Covers | When to Load |
|---|---|---|
| dep-confusion | Public-registry impersonation of private package names, scoped-package abuse (@org/pkg), internal-name OSINT (lockfiles, GitHub Actions, Dockerfiles, error pages) | Target uses private npm/PyPI/RubyGems/Cargo registries and you've discovered internal package names in public artifacts |
# Lockfiles often expose private package names that aren't on public registry
grep -hE '"name":|"@.+/' package-lock.json yarn.lock pnpm-lock.yaml | sort -u
# pip
grep -E '^[a-z0-9_-]+' requirements.txt
# go.mod
grep '^\s*[a-z0-9./_-]\+\s' go.mod
# Maven
grep -A1 '<artifactId>' pom.xml | grep -v '^--$'postinstall, setup.py install) — focus PoCs on benign callbacks, not RCE./skills/standard/exploit/ad/SKILL.md (CI-as-AD-equivalent paths) and the broader threat-modeling under /skills/shared/opsec/SKILL.md.0cf691e
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.