terraform-state-leak
Exploit exposed Terraform state files — secrets, cloud creds, RDS passwords, IAM keys, and infrastructure topology in plain JSON.
53
61%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/cloud/terraform-state-leak/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
This document is explicitly malicious: it provides step-by-step techniques to discover, extract, validate, and abuse Terraform state files and embedded credentials for unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and lateral pivoting.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill instructs extracting secrets from terraform.tfstate and then printing/embedding them verbatim into commands, environment variables, and knowledge-graph labels (e.g., jq outputs, aws cli env vars, mysql -p$PASSWORD, kg_add_node label), which requires the LLM to handle and output secret values directly.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
This skill’s runtime workflow is about finding and parsing exposed `terraform.tfstate` and then “Decepticon ingest” via `tfstate_audit("/tmp/state.tfstate")`, which would require the LLM/agent to read outsider-provided state content (from public web/S3/Git/history) as free-form JSON text.
- Repository
- PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
- Commit
e34afba
- Audited
- Security analysis
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