Classify a bounded batch of stale PR CI failures and choose the safest response.
61
71%
Does it follow best practices?
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High
Do not use without reviewing
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tessl review fix ./.qwen/skills/ci-flaky-patrol/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill requires copying fields verbatim from input candidates and explicitly instructs taking flakyTest file/name "verbatim from the log", which forces the model to emit user-supplied strings and could exfiltrate secrets if any appear in those logs or candidate fields.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
SKILL.md instructs the runtime to “Read `ci-flaky-input.json` from the caller's workdir” and treat its `log` fields as untrusted data, and that `log` content (outsider-authored from PR/CI output) is ingested as free text into the LLM context for classification—so this is an indirect prompt-injection exposure path.
8878264
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