WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X / EAP) attack methodology — EAP method identification (PEAP-MSCHAPv2, EAP-TTLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-GTC, EAP-PWD, EAP-FAST), evil-twin RADIUS attacks with eaphammer for credential capture, MSCHAPv2 challenge-response cracking, EAP-TLS client certificate theft paths (DPAPI, NDES, AD CS auto-enrollment), supplicant validation bypass (missing server cert validation, missing CN pinning, BYOD misconfigurations), and post-capture pivots into AD via cracked domain credentials. Use for corporate Wi-Fi engagements where the network is 802.1X authenticated.
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Critical
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Security
4 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
The URL http://ndes.corp.local/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll is a direct link to a .dll on an internal/untrusted NDES/SCEP endpoint (can be abused for unauthorized enrollment or to serve executable content), while the GitHub link is just a documentation page and not flagged.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document provides explicit, actionable instructions for deploying rogue Wi‑Fi (evil-twin) RADIUS servers, capturing and cracking authentication material, stealing client certificates, abusing enrollment services, and pivoting into Active Directory — indicating clear malicious intent and use for credential theft and unauthorized access.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The prompt shows captured credentials (user/challenge/response) and explicit cracked passwords and instructs embedding them verbatim into commands (e.g., asleap/hashcat inputs and SMB/bloodhound CLI with -p), which requires the LLM to handle/output secret values directly.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
This skill explicitly instructs running privileged commands (sudo tshark, sudo airodump-ng), using eaphammer --cert-wizard and spoofing BSSID/MAC, and enrolling/creating certs (sscep), all of which require elevated privileges and modify the host/network state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow is a cybersecurity attack guide that captures Wi‑Fi authentication exchange and then reads attacker-captured credentials/challenges (e.g., “When a client associates, eaphammer logs: [*] User… [*] Challenge… [*] Response…”), meaning outsider-authored free-form text from real client devices (not the operating user) is ingested into the agent context via the runtime console/log parsing path.
24d7968
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