当用户要求利用、检测或测试 Apache Shiro rememberMe 反序列化漏洞 (Shiro-550, CVE-2016-4437) 时使用。触发词包括 "Shiro"、"rememberMe"、"shiro attack"、"CVE-2016-4437"、"Shiro-550"、"爆破 Shiro key"、"利用 Shiro"、"Shiro 漏洞"。覆盖单目标探测、密钥爆破、Gadget 链自动检测、命令执行、内存马注入和 Key 修改。
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Critical
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Security
4 findings: 2 critical severity, 2 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
These URLs point to a GitHub repo's releases and raw content used to distribute an executable JAR (ShiroAttack2) — an exploit/dual-use tool hosted by an unverified account, which is a suspicious source for downloadable executables.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This README documents an offensive exploitation tool that automates Shiro deserialization attacks: it enables key brute-forcing, remote command execution, in-memory webshell/backdoor injection, and changing authentication keys—actions clearly intended for unauthorized compromise and persistence.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill prompt includes and requires embedding secret values (Shiro AES keys, passwords, --newkey) directly in command-line arguments and examples, which forces the LLM to reproduce secret values verbatim if it generates commands or code.
Detected sensitive credentials directly embedded within the skill content, such as API keys, access tokens, private keys, or service-specific secrets. Secrets should never be hardcoded in plain text within skill instructions.
I flagged the two Base64 strings because they are high-entropy, literal AES keys (usable Shiro "rememberMe" keys) present directly in the documentation. They are not placeholders (e.g., YOUR_KEY) nor simple setup passwords, so they meet the definition of a secret. No other entries contain high-entropy credentials; other values are option names, examples, or explanatory text.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The README instructs using curl on https://api.github.com/repos/SummerSec/ShiroAttack2/releases/latest to locate/download the shiro_attack JAR which is then executed (java -cp $JAR ...), so a remote URL is fetched at runtime and the fetched JAR executes remote code.
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