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prp-loop

Run the autonomous cyclic PRP pipeline end to end (plan → implement → pr → review, looping review→fix until the PR is clean). Use when the user wants to "ship feature X end to end", "run the full PRP loop", "auto-implement and open a PR for a feature", or invokes $prp-loop.

80

Quality

100%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

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SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

What this means

Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.

Why it was flagged

This script intentionally invokes headless agent CLIs with flags that bypass permissions/sandboxing and automates git pushes/commits, creating a high-risk capability for data exfiltration, remote code execution, or repo tampering if abused.

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Low

Low-risk findings.

1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

Very likely: the orchestrator reads the PR review verdict and other stage “result” text from files/artifacts it produces, but at runtime those results ultimately come from the agent/skills interacting with the PR and its comments (review findings are outsider-authored code/PR discussion content, e.g., PR text/issues discussion), which are then injected back into the next fix prompts via `failures`/`pending_findings` and thus into the LLM context via `run_agent(prompt)`.

Repository
Wirasm/prp
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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