家庭成员身份注册主流程。**用户表达「想让系统认识/记住/录入某个人」的意图就触发本 SKILL,不要求出现"注册/登记"字面词**——包括上传图/视频指明某人是谁、回应 `[感知引擎]` 陌生人推送、说"建档案/录入家人/记下样子"、指认摄像头里某人身份、从近期陌生人记录里挑人建档、撤销注册、查看某人样本。覆盖"上传图/视频"与"从摄像头挑人"两条通路,所有路径需用户确认才入库。仅改 person 行(改名/删人,不涉及样本)走 miloco-miot-identity。
76
96%
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Critical
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Security
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The skill explicitly documents tooling to fetch camera "stranger" clusters, upload/commit people’s images/videos, and map camera IDs (including a 72h cluster retention), which enables systematic biometric collection and potential unauthorized surveillance or data exfiltration; no obfuscated/backdoor code or remote-exec constructs were found.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
该技能在运行时会把用户消息/推送解析出的自由文本(如姓名、角色、摄像头口语指称与时间 hint)用于选择分支并直接参与工具参数映射(例如用于 `device list` 后的摄像头 `--cam` 匹配与 `pool fetch --window` 抽取),属于从外部输入到检索/取候选流程的直接暴露路径。
095782d
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.