Use this skill whenever a Microsoft PowerPoint (.pptx) file is being produced, opened, transformed, or read. That includes: authoring slide decks, pitch decks, executive readouts, training material, or any presentation deliverable; extracting text or structure from an existing .pptx; filling a .pptx template with values; converting a deck to PDF or images; splitting or merging decks; inspecting slides, layouts, masters, tables, images, charts, speaker notes, or comments. Trigger on words like 'deck', 'slides', 'presentation', 'pitch deck', 'keynote' (when a .pptx is expected as output), or any filename ending in .pptx. Do NOT trigger when the primary deliverable is a Word document, spreadsheet, PDF report, HTML site, or Google Slides API call, even if presentation-shaped content appears along the way.
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
Several URLs point to remote installer scripts (shell/PowerShell) - https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh, https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 and https://bun.sh/install - which are direct script downloads that are higher-risk to curl|sh or invoke in PowerShell; the remaining URLs are standard docs/repos and not suspicious.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs running system-level installers (curl | sh installers and package installs) including a sudo apt-get command, which requests elevated privileges and modifies the host system state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow extracts slide/speaker-note text from the user-provided `.pptx` using scripts like `scripts/dump_text.py` and feeds the extracted free text into the agent/LLM context (i.e., slide contents come from an outsider-authored document, which may contain prompt-injection text).
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The SKILL.md one-time setup includes shell/PowerShell install commands that fetch-and-execute remote install scripts (curl ... | sh and irm ... | iex) from https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh and https://bun.sh/install (and their PowerShell variants), which runs remote code at setup time.
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