Use when the user asks how code works, wants to understand architecture, trace execution flows, or explore unfamiliar parts of the codebase. Examples: "How does X work?", "What calls this function?", "Show me the auth flow"
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Low-risk findings worth noting
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tessl review fix ./.claude/skills/gitnexus-exploring/SKILL.mdLow
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
SKILL.md’s required workflow reads repository-derived resources via `gitnexus://repos` / `gitnexus://repo/{name}/context` / `gitnexus://repo/{name}/process/{name}`, which at runtime would ingest outsider-authored codebase text/metadata (e.g., staleness/context traces and execution-flow descriptions) into the agent’s LLM context.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill issues runtime READ calls like gitnexus://repo/{name}/context (and related gitnexus://... endpoints) which are fetched at runtime and directly injected into the agent's context to control its responses, so these external URLs represent required runtime content that can control prompts.
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