将编码工作委托给 Manager 持有的 AI CLI 工具(Claude Code / Gemini CLI / qodercli)执行
60
71%
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Critical
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tessl review fix ./manager/agent/skills-alpha/worker-skills/coding-cli/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The skill explicitly instructs uploading entire workspace files (including anything under /root) to an external MinIO storage and delegating execution to a remote Manager/CLI, which creates an intentional remote-code-execution/backdoor and data-exfiltration pathway that can leak sensitive files and allow arbitrary code changes.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow reads outsider-authored free text from the repository/workspace content (e.g., via `git clone <repo-url>` or copying external source into `/root/agentteams-fs/.../workspace`), and that content is then ingested into the Manager’s CLI context when the `coding-request` is sent with `workspace: /root/agentteams-fs/shared/tasks/{task-id}/workspace`.
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