bmad-sprint-planning
Generate sprint status tracking from epics. Use when the user says "run sprint planning" or "generate sprint plan"
65
77%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./src/bmm-skills/4-implementation/bmad-sprint-planning/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
The workflow executes arbitrary activation steps and a configurable on_complete instruction from merged customization files and can load arbitrary files under the project root, creating a high-risk remote code execution/data-exfiltration vector if those configuration sources are untrusted.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to load config and persistent files (including personal override files) and then write resolved config fields—such as project_key and other config values—into the generated sprint-status.yaml, which forces the LLM to emit any sensitive values verbatim if present.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Yes: the required workflow loads outsider-authored markdown epic files from `{planning_artifacts}/*epic*.md` (or sharded equivalents) as readable prose at runtime to “extract all work items,” which then becomes LLM context (indirect prompt-injection risk via arbitrary user content in epic files).
- Repository
- bmad-code-org/BMAD-METHOD
- Commit
bb45db4
- Audited
- Security analysis
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