AI Risk Management — Beyond Security, the Whole Model Lifecycle

prompt-injection covers the AI security slice — attackers manipulating LLM inputs. This skill covers everything else risk-related about deploying AI / ML systems: governance, fairness, robustness, transparency, monitoring, incident response specific to AI failures, third-party model risk, and compliance with the emerging AI regulatory landscape.

The framing is NIST AI RMF 1.0 (released 2023) — the most widely-adopted voluntary framework — plus the regulatory layer (EU AI Act, US executive orders, sector-specific guidance). Use this skill when you are deploying AI features beyond a chatbot wrapper, when a regulator asks "how do you govern your AI," or when something has gone wrong with an AI system in production.

Cross-references: prompt-injection for prompt-injection / LLM-specific security attacks; threat-modeling for design-time AI risk modeling; incident-triage and breach-patterns for AI-related incident response patterns; csf-mapping for the broader governance frame that AI RMF sits within.

The NIST AI RMF — four functions

Just like the cybersecurity framework, the AI RMF organizes the work into functions. Same shape, different content.

The framework is voluntary but increasingly cited in contracts, RFPs, executive orders, and emerging regulations. Treat it as the lingua franca of AI risk.

Workflow

Step 1 — Inventory AI systems

Before assessment, build the inventory. Most organizations underestimate how much AI they actually deploy.

For each, record: vendor (if any), training data source, deployment context, who it affects, the decision it informs, how decisions are reviewed.

Step 2 — MAP: assess the context per system

For each AI system in the inventory, answer:

• Purpose — what is this system's stated goal? Does the actual deployment match?
• Stakeholders — who interacts with it, who is affected by its decisions, who is in a position to challenge those decisions?
• Legal / regulatory context — is this in scope for a specific law? (EU AI Act high-risk categories, US HUD fair-housing rules, EEOC for employment AI, FTC for unfair / deceptive practices, sector laws)
• Failure modes — what does "broken" look like? (Wrong answer, biased answer, hallucinated answer, slow answer, expensive answer, refused-to-answer-something-it-should, answered-something-it-should-not)
• Reversibility — when this system makes a wrong call, can the decision be undone? (Mortgage denial: hard to undo. Spam filter: easy)

Step 3 — MEASURE: evaluate the system

The categories of evaluation, with the engineering hooks for each:

Accuracy / performance

• Test set evaluation — held-out data, not the training data
• Performance on slices of data, not just aggregate (the system that's 95% accurate overall may be 60% accurate on the demographic that's most impacted)
• Confusion matrices for classification; quantile-based error analysis for regression
• For LLMs: task-specific evals (HELM, MMLU, custom evals) — and especially custom evals on the application's actual prompts

Fairness / bias

• Demographic parity — does the system produce similar outcomes across protected classes?
• Equalized odds — are false-positive and false-negative rates similar across groups?
• Calibration — when the system says "80% likely," is that actually 80% across all groups?
• Individual fairness — do similar inputs produce similar outputs?

These metrics often conflict — you cannot maximize all of them simultaneously. The MAP step should have decided which is most important for the use case. For hiring AI, equalized odds matters more than demographic parity. For loan approval, the choice depends on whose interests dominate.

Tooling: Fairlearn (Microsoft), AI Fairness 360 (IBM), What-If Tool (Google), Aequitas (University of Chicago), fairlearn.metrics, aif360.metrics.

Robustness

• Adversarial inputs — perturbations that flip predictions (Foolbox, ART for traditional ML)
• Distribution shift — does the model degrade when the input distribution changes (it will, eventually)?
• Stress testing — extreme but plausible inputs

For LLMs:

• Prompt injection (see prompt-injection)
• Jailbreaks (DAN-style, role-play, encoded instructions, multi-turn manipulation)
• Indirect prompt injection (untrusted content the model reads)
• Output stability across paraphrased prompts

Explainability / transparency

• Local explanations — why did the model make this decision? SHAP, LIME, integrated gradients
• Global explanations — what features matter overall to the model?
• Model cards — Google's documentation pattern for ML models. Includes intended use, performance metrics, training data, limitations, ethical considerations
• System cards — for LLM-integrated systems, a longer-form version describing the entire AI pipeline

A model that cannot be explained at all is a model you cannot defend in a regulatory inquiry. For high-impact decisions, explainability is not optional.

Privacy

• Does the model leak training data? (Membership-inference attacks, training-data-extraction attacks for LLMs)
• Are inputs / outputs containing PII appropriately scoped (see privacy-engineering)?
• For LLM fine-tuning: are PII redaction passes applied to training data?

Security

See prompt-injection — prompt injection, indirect injection, agent privilege boundaries, MCP security. Output to the AI RMF assessment is the security posture summary.

Step 4 — MANAGE: treat the risks

For each material risk surfaced in MEASURE:

Step 5 — GOVERN: structures and policies

The persistent layer that makes the above work over time.

• AI principles — written, board-approved, public if possible (Google AI Principles, Microsoft Responsible AI Standard, OpenAI Usage Policies are reference points)
• Roles — who is the AI risk owner? Who reviews new AI deployments? Who can stop one?
• Approval gates — high-impact AI systems (per the MAP step) require review before deployment. Low-impact systems do not — overengineering kills the process
• Documentation cadence — model cards updated on every retrain; system cards updated on every major change
• Incident response for AI — what triggers an investigation? (Wrong-answer rate above threshold, demographic-disparity spike, jailbreak in the wild)
• Decommissioning — every deployed model has an end-of-life plan. Production models with no owner and no maintenance are the AI version of unmaintained dependencies

Regulatory layer (high level — counsel determines specifics)

EU AI Act (in force 2024, enforcement phasing in through 2026)

Risk-tiered framework:

• Prohibited — social scoring by governments, certain biometric categorization, manipulative AI. Do not deploy
• High-risk — employment / education / credit / law enforcement / critical infrastructure / certain public services. Required: risk management system, data governance, technical documentation, transparency, human oversight, accuracy / robustness, registration in EU database, conformity assessment
• Limited risk — chatbots, deepfakes. Required: transparency (tell users they are interacting with AI; label AI-generated content)
• Minimal risk — most current AI applications. Voluntary codes of conduct

US (federal patchwork)

• Executive Order 14110 (2023) — AI safety, model reporting, NIST guidance development
• FTC enforcement under unfair / deceptive practices authority — particularly for AI claims and AI used in pricing / hiring / housing
• EEOC enforcement for employment AI
• Sector-specific (HUD for housing, CFPB for credit, FDA for medical AI)
• State laws (Colorado AI Act, NYC bias audit for AEDT, Illinois BIPA for biometrics, California AB-2013 / SB-942)

Standards (voluntary but referenced)

• NIST AI RMF 1.0 + Generative AI Profile
• ISO/IEC 42001 — AI management system standard
• ISO/IEC 23894 — AI risk management

Output format

# AI Risk Assessment
## System(s): [list]
## Framework: NIST AI RMF 1.0 [+ EU AI Act mapping if applicable]
## Date: [date]
## Assessor: [name]

### Executive summary
[2-3 paragraphs — top risks, governance posture, regulatory exposure, recommended next 90 days]

### AI system inventory
| System | Purpose | Stakeholders | Risk tier (per MAP) | Owner |
|--------|---------|--------------|---------------------|-------|

### MEASURE findings
| System | Category | Finding | Severity |
|--------|----------|---------|----------|
| [name] | Fairness | [Disparity description with metric] | High |
| [name] | Robustness | [Failure mode] | Medium |

### MANAGE plan
| Risk | Treatment | Owner | Deadline |
|------|-----------|-------|----------|

### GOVERN posture
- [ ] AI principles documented and approved
- [ ] AI inventory maintained
- [ ] Approval gate exists for high-impact deployments
- [ ] Model cards / system cards in place for production AI
- [ ] AI incident response defined
- [ ] Decommissioning plans exist

### Regulatory mapping (if applicable)
| Regulation | Status | Action items |
|------------|--------|--------------|

### References / evidence
[Links to model cards, eval reports, audit logs]

Disposition rule (Fixed / Deferred / Accepted Risk) per owasp-audit. AI accepted-risk decisions need both engineering and (often) legal / ethics sign-off depending on system impact.

Boundaries

• This skill produces risk assessments, governance artifacts, and implementation guidance
• For high-stakes regulated AI (medical devices, autonomous systems, hiring AI subject to local audit laws), regulatory determinations are made with counsel — this skill produces engineering inputs to that process, not the final compliance posture
• Refuse to help build AI systems that fall into the EU AI Act prohibited list, that violate civil rights laws (disparate impact in protected-class decisions), or that surveil individuals without lawful basis
• Refuse to help build systems designed to evade transparency / disclosure requirements (e.g., undisclosed bots, deepfakes designed to deceive in regulated contexts)
• For AI safety topics adjacent to but distinct from this skill (model alignment research, catastrophic-risk research, frontier model evaluation), defer to specialized literature and frontier labs — this skill is enterprise-deployment risk management

References

• NIST AI RMF 1.0 — nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework (foundational)
• NIST AI RMF Generative AI Profile — addendum specific to generative AI
• EU AI Act — artificialintelligenceact.eu (community-maintained guide) and official text via EUR-Lex
• NIST AI 100-1, 100-2 — companion documents
• ISO/IEC 42001 — AI management system standard
• OECD AI Principles — international reference
• EEOC technical assistance on AI in employment
• FTC guidance on AI — "Aiming for truth, fairness, and equity in your company's use of AI"
• Google Responsible AI Practices + Model Card Toolkit
• Microsoft Responsible AI Standard v2
• OpenAI Usage Policies + System Cards (for examples of system-card disclosure)
• Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy + Acceptable Use Policy (for examples of governance disclosure)
• MIT AI Risk Repository — academic-curated catalog of AI risks
• Stanford CRFM Foundation Model Transparency Index — comparative transparency assessments
• Fairlearn, AI Fairness 360, What-If Tool, Aequitas — fairness evaluation tooling
• HELM (Holistic Evaluation of Language Models), MMLU, TruthfulQA — LLM evaluation benchmarks