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cicd-security

Audit CI/CD pipelines, GitHub Actions first and GitLab CI and CircleCI briefly, for the paths that give an outsider code execution, secrets or a write token: pull_request_target and workflow_run running untrusted code, expression injection into run steps, missing or broad workflow permissions, third-party actions not pinned to a commit SHA, OIDC trust policies with wildcard subjects, self-hosted runners on public repos, secrets reaching forks, cache and artifact trust between workflows, and AI agents in CI that read issue or PR text while holding a write token. Runs zizmor and actionlint read-only and writes findings.json. Use when the user mentions 'pull_request_target,' 'pwn request,' 'workflow injection,' 'zizmor,' 'actionlint,' 'pin actions to SHA,' 'GITHUB_TOKEN permissions,' 'self-hosted runner,' 'claude-code-action,' 'AI agent in CI,' 'GitLab CI security,' 'CircleCI security,' 'is this workflow safe,' or needs to secure a build pipeline.

Quality

93%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

Low

Low-risk findings worth noting

SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Quality

Content

92%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.

A highly actionable, well-sequenced audit workflow with excellent progressive disclosure: every step carries executable commands, validation is built in (refutation, verdicts, a validator script), and detail is pushed to real one-level-deep references. The only weakness is length — the body could shed its worked-verdict examples and platform-change dates to references or a deprecated section.

DimensionReasoningScore

Conciseness

The body is dense with non-obvious domain specifics (trigger/trust table, the December 2025 pull_request_target default-branch change, fingerprint and ext-key formats) and never explains concepts Claude already knows. It is nonetheless long (~320 lines), carries time-sensitive dates outside any 'old patterns' section, and inlines worked-verdict examples that could live in worked-examples.md — fitting the 4 anchor ('efficient; minor instances of over-explanation that could be trimmed') rather than 5's 'every token earns its place'.

4 / 5

Actionability

Guidance is fully executable throughout: exact commands ("zizmor --offline --format=json .", "actionlint -format '{{json .}}'", "node references/validate-findings.mjs findings.json"), concrete rg/grep patterns, per-trigger trust tables, a verdict table with named YAML examples, fingerprint formats with examples, and a copy-paste report template. Matches the 5 anchor; nothing is pseudocode or hand-wavy.

5 / 5

Workflow Clarity

Six explicitly sequenced steps (Inventory → Run tools → Trigger/holdings analysis → Checks → Platform facts → Verify/record) with real validation checkpoints: a mandatory refutation step, a validator script run before reporting, and a re-run rule ('a rejected record stays rejected unless the line in ruled_out_by.location changed'). The feedback loop (candidate → refute → verdict → validate → write) matches the 5 anchor; a 4 would have missing checkpoints, which it does not.

5 / 5

Progressive Disclosure

The body is a genuine overview that delegates detail to ten real, one-level-deep reference files (checks.md, ai-agents-in-ci.md, gitlab-circleci.md, verification.md, findings-format.md, severity-calibration.md, worked-examples.md, validate-findings.mjs, to-sarif.mjs, findings.schema.json — all verified present), each linked at its point of use with a stated purpose. Navigation is easy and content is appropriately split (~27KB body vs ~125KB references), matching the 5 anchor.

5 / 5

Total

19

/

20

Passed

Description

92%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Based on the skill's description, can an agent find and select it at the right time? Clear, specific descriptions lead to better discovery.

An exemplary description: it names the domain, enumerates the specific outsider-code-execution paths it audits, states the tools and output artifact, and closes with an explicit, quote-rich 'Use when' trigger list. The only gap is a handful of missing natural synonyms (e.g., 'GitHub Actions security', workflow file paths) in the trigger list.

DimensionReasoningScore

Specificity

The description enumerates ten-plus concrete audit capabilities by name ("pull_request_target and workflow_run running untrusted code, expression injection into run steps, missing or broad workflow permissions, third-party actions not pinned to a commit SHA, OIDC trust policies with wildcard subjects…") plus the tools run ("Runs zizmor and actionlint read-only") and the output ("writes findings.json"). This is comprehensive concrete coverage, matching the 5 anchor rather than 4, which expects minor gaps.

5 / 5

Completeness

Both halves are explicit: what it does ("Audit CI/CD pipelines… for the paths that give an outsider code execution, secrets or a write token… Runs zizmor and actionlint… writes findings.json") and when to use it ("Use when the user mentions 'pull_request_target,'… or needs to secure a build pipeline") with concrete trigger phrases. This matches the 5 anchor exactly; a 4 would require the 'when' to be less explicit, which it is not.

5 / 5

Trigger Term Quality

Strong natural trigger phrases ("'pwn request,' 'workflow injection,' 'zizmor,' 'is this workflow safe,' 'self-hosted runner,' 'claude-code-action'") that users would genuinely say. A few common variations are missing from the trigger list — most notably "GitHub Actions security" as an explicit phrase and file-path triggers like ".github/workflows" or "*.yml" — so it fits the 4 anchor ("good keyword coverage; a few natural terms missing") better than 5's requirement of synonyms and file extensions.

4 / 5

Distinctiveness Conflict Risk

A clear niche (CI/CD pipeline security auditing) with highly distinctive triggers — 'zizmor', 'pwn request', 'GITHUB_TOKEN permissions', 'claude-code-action' — that no adjacent skill (dependency audit, secrets rotation, cloud IAM) would claim. Minimal conflict risk, matching the 5 anchor rather than 4's 'minor overlap risk with closely related skills'.

5 / 5

Total

19

/

20

Passed

Validation

93%

Checks the skill against the spec for correct structure and formatting. All validation checks must pass before discovery and implementation can be scored.

Validation — 15 / 16 Passed

Validation for skill structure

CriteriaDescriptionResult

allowed_tools_field

'allowed-tools' contains unusual tool name(s)

Warning

Total

15

/

16

Passed

Repository

briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills

Path

skills/cicd-security/SKILL.md

Reviewed

Table of Contents

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