Audit CI/CD pipelines, GitHub Actions first and GitLab CI and CircleCI briefly, for the paths that give an outsider code execution, secrets or a write token: pull_request_target and workflow_run running untrusted code, expression injection into run steps, missing or broad workflow permissions, third-party actions not pinned to a commit SHA, OIDC trust policies with wildcard subjects, self-hosted runners on public repos, secrets reaching forks, cache and artifact trust between workflows, and AI agents in CI that read issue or PR text while holding a write token. Runs zizmor and actionlint read-only and writes findings.json. Use when the user mentions 'pull_request_target,' 'pwn request,' 'workflow injection,' 'zizmor,' 'actionlint,' 'pin actions to SHA,' 'GITHUB_TOKEN permissions,' 'self-hosted runner,' 'claude-code-action,' 'AI agent in CI,' 'GitLab CI security,' 'CircleCI security,' 'is this workflow safe,' or needs to secure a build pipeline.
93%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The cicd-security skill reviews CI/CD configurations, workflows, and AI agents in CI that read issue or PR text (such as GitHub Actions workflow files and related outsider-submission paths), presenting an indirect prompt injection risk via outsider-authored free text.
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills
18642b2
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