Reviews DeerFlow skill packages for readiness, triggers, safety boundaries, resources, and evidence. Invoke when users ask to audit, grade, or production-check an existing skill.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The prompt-injection fixture (evals/fixtures/prompt-injection/SKILL.md) contains explicit instructions to run a shell, print environment variables (exfiltrate secrets), and fetch an external URL — a direct credential-exfiltration/backdoor attempt.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Yes: the required workflow calls `review_skill_package` (SKILL.md:42) and then applies a semantic rubric over “target content returned” (SKILL.md:33, 52-57), which can include outsider-authored free-form text from the reviewed package/inline SKILL.md; that content is necessarily ingested into the agent’s LLM context for summarization/analysis.
bytedance/deer-flow
085b52b
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.