Use when the user asks to "create a main agent", "set up a main agent", "add my main agent to Cekura", "configure my main agent", "connect my main agent", "set up mock tools", "add tools to my agent", "upload knowledge base", "configure integration", "connect VAPI", "connect Retell", "connect LiveKit", "connect ElevenLabs", "add dynamic variables", or needs to onboard a voice AI agent onto the Cekura platform. Covers the full agent setup flow: project selection, provider selection, basics and connection type, description, main agent creation, mock tools, knowledge base, dynamic variables, and advanced configuration.
72
88%
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Critical
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Security
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The content instructs automated, non-consensual SDK/code edits and background tooling that capture and upload sensitive runtime data (transcripts, tool calls, dual-channel audio) and enables periodic import of real production calls — clear intentional data-exfiltration and remote-observability behavior.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill explicitly tells the agent to "collect all credentials upfront" (including provider api_key/agent_id) and documents using X-CEKURA-API-KEY: <key> as an auth header — forcing the agent to accept and embed secret API keys in requests/commands if it performs provider or raw API calls.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Phase 11 performs an end-to-end scenario run (e.g., `mcp__cekura__scenarios_run_text`/`...run_voice`) and then the agent must inspect the resulting `transcript_object`, which contains free-text generated from outsider caller input.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill instructs cloning and running the official WebSocket server example (git clone https://github.com/cekura-ai/llm-websocket-server-example.git / https://github.com/cekura-ai/llm-websocket-server-example), which fetches and executes remote code that is used at runtime to scaffold a test agent and directly controls system prompts/behaviour, so this is a runtime dependency that can execute remote code.
af2ceb6
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