onboard
Onboard a new user OR curate a single piece of the assistant's inner state. Without arguments, runs the full first-run ceremony (AI name, personality, user profile, SOUL.md + USER.md, optional browser + personal website). With `scope:soul` or `scope:user`, runs a quick chat to update just that one profile file. With `path:<abs>`, runs a quick chat to update / keep / delete one memory file under ~/.clacky/memories/.
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
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tessl review fix ./lib/clacky/default_skills/onboard/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
High supply-chain / code-injection risk: the onboarding flow silently or automatically fetches and installs external skill packages (ZIPs) from remote hosts and can import/copy external skill directories into the user's runtime without cryptographic verification, enabling installation of arbitrary code.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The skill’s first-run mode (“A.6. Learn from links”) explicitly fetches and ingests bio/projects/interests from user-provided URLs via `web_search`/fetch before writing SOUL.md and USER.md, creating an indirect prompt-injection exposure path.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The onboarding flow (SKILL.md:208-209) runs scripts/install_builtin_skills.rb which at runtime queries external endpoints (PRIMARY_HOST 'https://www.openclacky.com' and FALLBACK_HOST 'https://openclacky.up.railway.app') to fetch a list of skills and download skill archives that will be installed, making remote content control the agent's installed skills and thus its behavior.
- Repository
- clacky-ai/openclacky
- Commit
4aea278
- Audited
- Security analysis
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