coding-agent-sessions
MUST USE when asked to find, read, list, search, inspect, fetch, export, or reconstruct coding-agent sessions across Codex, Claude Code/Desktop, OpenCode, Senpi/pi, oh-my-pi (omp), gajae-code (gjc), OpenClaw, Factory Droid, Amp, Gemini/Kimi/Qwen CLIs, Codebuff, Roo/Kilo/Cline, Kodu, Cursor CLI, Aider, Aside browser-agent sessions, or unknown local agent logs. Covers transcripts, session IDs, rollout JSONL, state SQLite, Claude projects/pre-compact histories, OpenCode messages/parts, child/subagent linkage, cwd/model/time/token filters, archives, and cost clues. Expands fuzzy recall into parallel query lanes and first probes known stores so absent platforms are skipped cheaply. Triggers: coding agent sessions, Codex/Claude/OpenCode/Senpi/pi/oh-my-pi/omp/gajae-code/gjc/OpenClaw/Droid/Amp/Kodu/Cursor/Aider/Aside sessions, transcript search, session history, session ID, read transcript, token usage, subagent sessions, what did I do yesterday, did we already do this.
75
93%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The runtime workflow `scripts/find-agent-sessions.py search/find -> scripts/agent_sessions/cli.py (_search_payload/_get_payload) -> scanners* -> transcript/content_text` ingests the user-input `--query` plus reads first/assistant user prompt text from local session transcript files (e.g., `~/.claude/.../*.jsonl`, `~/.opencode/messages/ses_*/...`) to match and summarize, so outsider-authored free text can enter only via compromised local stores but not via arbitrary external submission/queue.
- Repository
- code-yeongyu/lazycodex
- Commit
10f9558
- Audited
- Security analysis
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