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ulw-research

Maximum-saturation research orchestration: parallel explore+librarian swarms across codebase, web, official docs, and OSS repos; a recursive EXPAND loop driven by leads workers return in message text; empirical verification by running code; cited synthesis and optional MD/HTML/PDF/PPTX reports. ACTIVATES ONLY on an explicit user demand for research — the word 'ulw-research' ('/ulw-research', '$ulw-research'), any 'ulw' research wording, or an explicit request for research / deep research / an ultra-precise investigation, in any language. Never self-activates for ordinary questions, debugging, or implementation context-gathering. While active it overrides exploration-bounding defaults: exhaustive coverage is the goal.

72

Quality

88%

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

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SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

What this means

Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.

Why it was flagged

The skill includes an explicit "Authority while active" clause that tells the agent to supersede or ignore surrounding prompts, stop-rules, and other modes (an "ignore previous instruction" style override) which attempts to override external/system constraints outside the orchestrator's stated remit.

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Low

Low-risk findings.

1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

The required workflow explicitly uses browsing/librarian workers that “fetch the full page for every result that matters” and then passes the workers’ message text back to the orchestrator, so outsider-authored web page/body text can be ingested into the LLM context via the worker→orchestrator message channel.

Repository
code-yeongyu/lazycodex
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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