Verify a released archon binary works end-to-end via a specific install path. Use when: cutting a new release, reproducing a user bug report on the released version, or validating that a hotfix binary actually works after a re-tag. Triggers: "test the release", "test 0.3.1 via brew", "verify the curl install", "smoke test the binary", "did the release binary work", "run /test-release", "verify the release". NOT for: testing dev work (use bun link directly), testing unreleased changes (build locally via scripts/build-binaries.sh first), or running the full validate suite (bun run validate is separate).
68
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Critical
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Security
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
The raw GitHub URL is a direct installer script from a personal repository that the skill pipes to bash (curl | bash), which is a high-risk delivery vector for arbitrary/malicious code; the brew.sh link is an official Homebrew site and not suspicious.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs installing and uninstalling system-wide binaries (brew tap/install/uninstall, running remote install scripts via curl|bash, moving files into brew prefixes) and even runs a remote sudo rm, which modifies system state and requires elevated privileges.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
This workflow pulls and executes outsider-authored free text from public GitHub content at runtime (via `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/.../scripts/install.sh | bash` and remote `ssh ... 'curl ... | bash'`), which is then ingested as shell-readable text and executed.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill runs the remote installer via curl | bash (executing fetched code) at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coleam00/Archon/main/scripts/install.sh during the curl-mac and curl-vps install paths, which is a runtime remote-code-execution dependency.
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