hunt-cicd
Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.
72
90%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
2 findings: 2 critical severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
What this means
Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
Why it was flagged
The document contains explicit, actionable instructions and payloads for remote code execution and secret exfiltration against CI/CD systems, clearly facilitating malicious attacks.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
The document contains explicit, runnable exploit payloads and commands that, if executed, perform unauthorized remote code execution and secret exfiltration (e.g., POST to Jenkins /scriptText to run shell, Groovy credential-dump, jenkins-cli "@/etc/passwd" file read, and GitHub Actions PR-title payloads that curl GITHUB_TOKEN to an attacker endpoint).
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
SKILL.md describes a workflow for hunting CI/CD vulnerabilities that ingests outsider-authored free text only when the attacker’s content (e.g., PR titles/body for GitHub Actions, fork PR code for checkout/build, or external Jenkins/GitLab targets’ contents) is fetched/executed as part of the testing steps rather than ingesting trusted first-party provider metadata.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The guide explicitly instructs downloading the remote Jenkins CLI artifact from /jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar and then executing it with "java -jar jenkins-cli.jar …", which fetches and runs external code at runtime ( /jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar ).
- Repository
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
- Commit
a3ea443
- Audited
- Security analysis
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