Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read / write / RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3/GCS/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services).
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Critical
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Security
2 findings: 2 critical severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
These URLs include generic/untrusted S3 bucket endpoints and Firebase database endpoints that can host arbitrary files or payloads (including executables) and are commonly abused to distribute malware or malicious artifacts.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The document contains explicit, actionable attack recipes for credential theft (Cognito/IMDS via SSRF), covert data exfiltration (CloudWatch RUM PutRumEvents), and supply‑chain/subdomain takeover techniques suitable for abuse.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill includes a docker run that pulls and executes a remote image ("localstack/localstack:3.0") at runtime (docker will fetch and run code from the registry), so it fetches and executes remote code as a required part of the local verification toolchain.
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