Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) password reset link works from a different IP/browser (no binding), (5) no rate limit on the reset request endpoint. These are the standalone recovery-flow broken-auth primitives — distinct from reset-email host-header poisoning (hunt-host-header) and the full ATO chain (hunt-ato owns password-reset as an ATO path; prove the primitive here, chain it there). Detection: trace the full forgot-password flow from request to token to use; check response diffs between valid/invalid emails; test token replay after consumption. Medium to High (enumeration=Medium, token-reuse=High, account-takeover=Critical when chained to known-email).
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Critical
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Security
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The document contains explicit, actionable instructions to enumerate usernames, extract and replay password-reset tokens, and chain these into account takeover (credential theft) and abuse such as inbox flooding — behavior consistent with deliberate malicious misuse.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill explicitly instructs extracting reset tokens from API responses and replaying them as proof, which requires handling and outputting secret token values verbatim (exfiltration risk).
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
SKILL.md instructs runtime HTTP requests against a “forgot-password” endpoint and to “record the response body/status code/length”; that response content is fetched from an external target (outsider-authored web/app output) and can include attacker-controlled text (e.g., JSON/HTML error messages), which would be ingested into the LLM context for analysis.
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