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hunt-springboot

Hunt Spring Boot specific vulnerabilities — Actuator endpoints (heapdump, env, loggers, mappings, shutdown), Spring Expression Language (SpEL) injection → RCE, H2 console RCE, Jolokia JMX exposure, Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965), Spring Cloud Function SPEL (CVE-2022-22963), heap dump credential extraction. Use when target runs Spring Boot — detected via X-Application-Context header, /actuator, Whitelabel Error Page, or Java stack traces.

69

Quality

85%

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

Do not install without reviewing

SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

4 findings: 3 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

What this means

Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.

Why it was flagged

The document provides explicit, step-by-step exploitation instructions and payloads to discover and exploit Spring Boot weaknesses for credential exfiltration and remote code execution.

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Critical

E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

What this means

Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly instructs targets to fetch and load attacker-controlled resources (e.g., jar:http://COLLAB_HOST/test.jar!/ and http://$COLLAB/logback.xml), directing the victim to download and execute code from untrusted "COLLAB" hosts.

Critical

E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

What this means

Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.

Why it was flagged

The document contains explicit exploit tooling and runtime commands intended to achieve unauthorized RCE and credential exfiltration — e.g., heapdump download + strings extraction, H2 CREATE ALIAS RCE, SpEL/Gateway payloads that call T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(...) to run curl callbacks, Spring4Shell webshell deployment, and Jolokia exec MBean calls.

High

W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

What this means

The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly instructs downloading actuator heapdumps and /env responses and running grep/strings to extract and print plaintext passwords, API keys (e.g. AKIA..., sk_live_...) and bearer tokens, which requires the agent/LLM to handle and output secret values verbatim — high exfiltration risk.

Low

Low-risk findings.

1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

The skill’s runtime workflow is an outsider-driven web reconnaissance/exploitation script that performs HTTP GET/POST requests to attacker-chosen targets (e.g., reading `/actuator`, `/actuator/env`, `/actuator/heapdump`, `/jolokia`, `/h2-console` and extracting secrets from their responses), so the LLM is exposed to outsider-authored free text coming from the target’s responses.

Repository
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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