oma-image
Multi-vendor AI image generation with authentication-aware parallel dispatch. Routes to Codex (gpt-image-2 via ChatGPT OAuth), Antigravity (Gemini-family "nano-banana" image models via `agy` CLI + Gemini Code Assist; exact model chosen internally by agy), and Pollinations (flux/zimage, free with signup). Use for image generation, image creation, visual asset generation, and AI art.
70
85%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
High risk: the skill mandates auto-forwarding host-attached images to external vendor CLIs and explicitly uses antigravity's "--dangerously-skip-permissions" while embedding absolute filesystem paths into prompts, enabling unintended data exfiltration and arbitrary remote file writes.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly instructs use of a vendor CLI flag that "dangerously" skips permissions and mandates auto-forwarding absolute reference paths (and embedding absolute output paths), which encourages bypassing host permission controls and writing to arbitrary filesystem locations.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
In SKILL.md + resources/execution-protocol.md, the workflow ingests the outsider-authored free-text “image prompt/creative brief” from the user request (and host-attached image paths) as the `<prompt>` passed into `oma image generate`, and then into vendor CLIs/APIs; there is no required “select a specific item” gate beyond user-supplied content itself.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly instructs agents to fetch README content from external GitHub prompt libraries at runtime (e.g., https://github.com/YouMind-OpenLab/awesome-nano-banana-pro-prompts) via a gh api command to guide prompt amplification, which is runtime fetching of remote content that directly controls prompt composition.
- Repository
- first-fluke/oh-my-agent
- Commit
032c988
- Audited
- Security analysis
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