Use when building a LaTeX manuscript submission pipeline with templates, latexmk, BibTeX/Biber, chktex, latexindent, CI PDF builds, compile debugging, and submission zip packaging.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Required workflow uses a GitHub Actions template that checks out the repository (`actions/checkout`) and then runs `xu-cheng/latex-action` to compile `manuscript/main.tex`, which will cause the agent/runner to ingest LaTeX source files from the (outsider) repository contents into the compilation context at runtime (including any free-text content in `main.tex`/`\input{}` files that could contain injection payloads).
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The GitHub Actions referenced in the workflow (actions/checkout@v4, xu-cheng/latex-action@v3, actions/upload-artifact@v4) are fetched and executed at CI runtime, meaning remote code from those repositories will run as part of the skill.
f627ab5
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