Install one extend-ui-svelte component into the current Svelte 5 project, with its engine dependencies, SSR-safe setup, and a minimal usage example. Invoked as /extend-ui-svelte:add-component <component-name>.
85%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The workflow fetches registry JSON and source code files from GitHub (`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fakebizprez/extend-ui-svelte/main/...`) during the copy-in installation path, which allows outsider-authored code and text to be ingested into the agent's context.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill instructs the agent to fetch code and configuration from `https://extend-ui-svelte.linehaul.ai` and `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fakebizprez/extend-ui-svelte`, which constitute weak/unknown/suspicious external operational dependencies.
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