minion-orchestrator
Unified Minions skill for both deterministic shell jobs and LLM subagent orchestration. Replaces the older `gbrain-jobs` routing intent. Use when: submitting gbrain jobs, shell/background tasks, spawning subagents, checking progress, steering running work, pausing/resuming, parallel fan-out. One durable, observable, steerable queue interface. Also carries the durable-execution doctrine for any operation expected to exceed ~2 minutes: capability ladder, deadman checks that verify the result was reported, and content-addressed stage checkpoints for expensive pipelines.
64
78%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
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tessl review fix ./skills/minion-orchestrator/SKILL.mdLow
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Within minion-orchestrator, the required runtime workflow for steering and monitoring subagent jobs ingests inbox messages and job transcripts at each iteration (via `send_job_message` → inbox read → injected as context), which can contain arbitrary free text authored by the outsider who sends the message.
- Repository
- garrytan/gbrain
- Commit
055ac6c
- Audited
- Security analysis
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