Run `gbrain skillpack-check` to produce an agent-readable JSON health report for the gbrain install. Wraps `gbrain doctor` + `gbrain apply-migrations --list` so a host agent (your OpenClaw's morning-briefing, any OpenClaw cron) can see at a glance whether the skillpack needs attention. Use when the user asks "is gbrain healthy?", when a cron fires a morning check, or proactively when something seems off (jobs not running, brain not updating, autopilot silent).
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Critical
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Security
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The document instructs executing untrusted commands from a remote JSON ("actions[]") via eval in a shell loop, which enables remote code execution if the report source is compromised.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill instructs the agent to report CLI JSON and actions[] verbatim and to eval commands from actions[], so any embedded API keys or passwords in those outputs would be echoed or executed by the LLM/agent, creating an exfiltration risk.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill instructs the agent to automatically execute arbitrary remediation commands from the report via an eval loop (SKILL.md:36-40), which could include privileged or system-modifying operations even though the examples shown are benign.
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If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.