skillpack-harvest
Lift a proven skill from a host repo (e.g. your OpenClaw fork) back into gbrain's bundle so other clients can scaffold it. Editorial workflow: the CLI does the file copy + privacy lint; this skill drives the judgment-heavy genericization (scrub real names, generalize triggers, lift fork-specific conventions to references).
56
66%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./skills/skillpack-harvest/SKILL.mdLow
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
In SKILL.md, the runtime path reads outsider-authored free text from the host repository by asking the user to run `gbrain skillpack harvest <slug> --from <host-repo-root>`, which then copies and lint-checks the host `skills/<slug>/` files (including `SKILL.md` frontmatter like `sources:`/`triggers:` and `routing-eval.jsonl` intent strings) into gbrain.
- Repository
- garrytan/gbrain
- Commit
055ac6c
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.