Grafana Beyla eBPF auto-instrumentation for application observability without code changes. Covers supported languages/runtimes, requirements, installation, configuration (discovery, eBPF settings, OTLP traces export, Prometheus metrics export), Kubernetes deployment, and integration with Grafana Cloud. Use when setting up zero-code instrumentation, configuring eBPF probes, deploying Beyla to Kubernetes, connecting to Tempo/Prometheus, or troubleshooting instrumentation issues.
68
82%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
3 findings — 3 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.75). Beyla’s runtime workflow ingests **HTTP/gRPC request/response data from instrumented services** (e.g., request paths/headers/body-derived fields) into its tracing/metrics pipeline, which is **outsider-authored free text** from external clients; this text is then included in the LLM context via any downstream “summarize/inspect traces” agent step.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.70). The installation instructions fetch and run remote code at runtime — e.g., pulling a Helm chart from https://grafana.github.io/helm-charts (helm repo add / helm install) and running the Docker image grafana/beyla (docker run) — which will execute external code, so these are runtime external dependencies.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.90). The prompt explicitly requires running with root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN and shows examples using privileged containers, hostPID, and hostPath mounts (e.g., /sys/kernel/debug), which instructs granting elevated host/kernel privileges and altering host state.
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