Install workspace skills from curated sources or import open-source skills from GitHub.
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
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tessl review fix ./runtime/harnesses/src/embedded-skills/skill-installer/SKILL.mdLow
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The installer skill ingests only provider-local workspace folder contents (SKILL.md and bundled files) when importing a GitHub folder via the runtime endpoints `POST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspaceId}/skills/import-github`, and does not describe a workflow that processes arbitrary outsider-authored free text without first selecting a specific GitHub-supplied item.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The installer explicitly accepts and fetches GitHub content at runtime (e.g., "github.com/anthropics/skills" and patterns like "github.com/<owner>/<repo>/tree/<ref>/<path>" and ".../blob/<ref>/<path>/SKILL.md"), which will be retrieved and written into the workspace and can directly control skill prompts/instructions, so this is a runtime external dependency that controls agent behavior.
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