Install workspace skills from curated sources or import open-source skills from GitHub.
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Low
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tessl review fix ./runtime/harnesses/src/embedded-skills/skill-installer/SKILL.mdLow
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
This workflow can fetch an arbitrary GitHub folder or `SKILL.md` (outsider-authored public web content) at runtime via the `import-github` endpoint, which returns and then installs the fetched file contents into the workspace `skills/` directory that the runtime auto-loads into the agent’s LLM context.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The installer explicitly instructs the runtime to fetch GitHub folders/files such as "github.com/anthropics/skills" and "github.com/<owner>/<repo>/tree/<ref>/<path>" at runtime, which will retrieve bundled SKILL.md plus scripts/assets that can be written into workspace skills and thus can control prompts or execute code.
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