Compare MCP tool behavior between target and baseline versions using pre-built and custom stories with diff-based triage.
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High
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tessl review fix ./.claude/skills/bat-story-eval/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The prompt explicitly instructs capturing an HA token from stderr and then embedding that token verbatim in subsequent CLI commands (e.g., --ha-token TOKEN), which requires the agent to handle and output secrets directly.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Runner reads pre-built story YAMLs (outsider-authored, since `tests/uat/stories/catalog/s*.yaml` and `/tmp/custom_c*.yaml` contents are not guaranteed to be operating-user-authored at runtime) and passes their free-form `prompt`/`setup` text into the agent via `tests/uat/stories/run_story.py` (prompt injection surface through story-authored text).
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