officecli-pitch-deck
Use this skill when the user is building a fundraising / investor pitch deck — seed, Series A / B / C, convertible note, SAFE round, strategic raise. Trigger on: 'pitch deck', 'investor deck', 'Series A deck', 'Series B deck', 'Series C deck', 'fundraising deck', 'seed pitch', 'VC deck', 'raising capital', 'term sheet presentation'. Output is a single .pptx. This skill is a scene layer on top of officecli-pptx — inherits every pptx v2 rule (visual floor, grid, palettes, connector canon, Delivery Gate). DO NOT invoke for a generic board review, sales deck, all-hands, or product launch — route those to officecli-pptx base.
67
81%
Does it follow best practices?
Run evals on this skill
Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
View guide
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
2 findings: 2 critical severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
What this means
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
Why it was flagged
These links include direct install scripts hosted on a non-standard domain that the README instructs users to pipe into a shell/PowerShell (curl | bash, irm | iex)—a high-risk pattern—and a GitHub releases page from a non-obvious/unknown username, all of which are commonly used to distribute malicious binaries or scripts.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
The document instructs users to execute remote installer scripts directly via "curl ... | bash" and "irm ... | iex", which are high-risk supply-chain / remote code execution vectors that can install backdoors or malicious payloads.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill's Setup includes direct install commands that fetch and execute remote scripts (curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bash and irm https://d.officecli.ai/install.ps1 | iex), which run external code at install/runtime and are presented as required to obtain the officecli dependency.
- Repository
- iOfficeAI/OfficeCLI
- Commit
459b1a4
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.