monitor-health-alerts
Retrieve disease outbreak alerts and PM2.5 air-quality health warnings. Use when the user asks about current public-health risks in a country, city, or region.
66
80%
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High
Do not use without reviewing
Security
2 findings: 2 high severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill mandates sending an API key in the X-WorldMonitor-Key header and even embeds a literal-looking API key example (wm_...), which could cause an LLM to output secret values verbatim (though the worked curl example uses an env var); this creates a risk of credential exfiltration if the LLM substitutes or echoes real keys.
W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
What this means
Detected sensitive credentials directly embedded within the skill content, such as API keys, access tokens, private keys, or service-specific secrets. Secrets should never be hardcoded in plain text within skill instructions.
Why it was flagged
Line 10 contains a literal, high-entropy API key-like value: "wm_0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567". This is not a generic placeholder (e.g., YOUR_API_KEY) nor a simple example password, and it appears to be a usable API credential. No other high-entropy secrets are present (the worked example uses an environment variable $WM_API_KEY, which is not a secret literal).
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The workflow calls external health service endpoints and ingests their JSON response fields (e.g., “summary”, “location”, “sourceUrl/sourceName”, and air-quality “source”) into the agent at runtime, which are outsider-authored free text coming from third-party feeds.
- Repository
- koala73/worldmonitor
- Commit
23ab7d1
- Audited
- Security analysis
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