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finish-session

Use when the user asks to finish or wrap up the session — checks that all they asked for is delivered, then commits, pushes and archives it. Not for a code review. Self-contained — execute the inlined steps directly, do NOT invoke other skills.

Quality

79%

Does it follow best practices?

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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

Do not install without reviewing

Fix and improve this skill with Tessl

tessl review fix ./plugins/flowai/skills/finish-session/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security
Critical

E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

What this means

Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.

Why it was flagged

The skill is a disclosed session-closing workflow with strict gates, refused force pushes, and a required user answer before any push, but its Reflect Phase autonomously edits the project's instruction and skill files and commits them without asking, which alters the user's work beyond the finish task.

Report incorrect finding
Medium

W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

What this means

The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.

Why it was flagged

The skill performs operational changes (pushing to the remote, which can trigger CI, and editing tracked agent instruction files), but it fails the irreversible-loss gate because the destructive `git reset --hard HEAD~1` is guarded and reversible, `git rm -r` is recoverable from history, and archiving requires confirmation for uncommitted files.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

The required workflow reads CI run logs via the AGENTS.md `Logs command` on the CI-red handoff path (line 243), and those logs can echo content from the pushed commit that an outsider may have influenced, such as test names or output; the workflow fetches them only after a selected failure, so this is low rather than medium. The remaining inputs (user messages, git status/diff/log, repo docs, task files) are first-party or the user's own content.

Repository

korchasa/flowai-plugins

Path

plugins/flowai/skills/finish-session/SKILL.md

Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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