Airship integration. Manage data, records, and automate workflows. Use when the user wants to interact with Airship data.
53
60%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/airship/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill instructs the agent to poll Membrane/Airship connections and act on returned clientAction objects (including clientAction.agentInstructions) and permits proxying arbitrary Airship API responses via membrane request, meaning it ingests third-party content that the agent is expected to read and that can change its actions (see the "Wait for the connection to be ready" and "Proxy requests" sections).
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill calls Membrane at runtime (e.g., `membrane connection ensure "https://www.airship.com/"`) and the returned JSON may include `clientAction.agentInstructions`, meaning remote content fetched during runtime can supply instructions that directly control the agent.
f484c82
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.