apm-spec-guardian
Use this skill to run a four-panel adversarial advisory review on any pull request that touches the OpenAPM specification artifact (docs/src/content/docs/specs/openapm-*.md), its inline / sidecar JSON Schemas (docs/src/content/docs/specs/schemas/*.schema.json), or the conformance fixture seed (tests/fixtures/spec-conformance/**). The panel fans out to four spec-ecosystem reviewers (swagger-openapi-editor, oci-distribution-editor, pkgmgr-registry-contract-editor, w3c-tag-architect), each running in its own agent thread, and a spec-editor synthesizer that produces a fold-now / defer-v0.1.1 / defer-v0.2 / reject list plus a ship decision keyed off a 1..10 shocked_meter scale. The orchestrator is the sole writer to the PR: ONE consolidated comment, no verdict labels, no merge gating. The panel is advisory -- it surfaces findings, prioritizes folds, and renders a ship recommendation that the maintainer weighs.
69
85%
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High
Do not use without reviewing
Security
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill requires including the full diff and the post-merge file contents in subagent prompts and then rendering synthesizer-provided patches and fold_now[] verbatim into a published comment, so any secrets present in the repo files or diff would be echoed by the LLM into its outputs (exfiltration risk).
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The skill ingests outsider-authored free text via PR-supplied content by passing the PR body, title, and the full diff inline into the Wave 3 panelist tasks, which then generate JSON based on that untrusted text and the modified in-scope spec artifact.
- Repository
- microsoft/apm
- Commit
71a877c
- Audited
- Security analysis
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