apm-spec-guardian
Use this skill to run a four-panel adversarial advisory review on any pull request that touches the OpenAPM specification artifact (docs/src/content/docs/specs/openapm-*.md), its inline / sidecar JSON Schemas (docs/src/content/docs/specs/schemas/*.schema.json), or the conformance fixture seed (tests/fixtures/spec-conformance/**). The panel fans out to four spec-ecosystem reviewers (swagger-openapi-editor, oci-distribution-editor, pkgmgr-registry-contract-editor, w3c-tag-architect), each running in its own agent thread, and a spec-editor synthesizer that produces a fold-now / defer-v0.1.1 / defer-v0.2 / reject list plus a ship decision keyed off a 1..10 shocked_meter scale. The orchestrator is the sole writer to the PR: ONE consolidated comment, no verdict labels, no merge gating. The panel is advisory -- it surfaces findings, prioritizes folds, and renders a ship recommendation that the maintainer weighs.
72
88%
Does it follow best practices?
Run evals on this skill
Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
View guide
High
Do not use without reviewing
Security
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The prompt explicitly requires passing the PR body, full diff, and the post-diff artifact contents into subagent prompts and later rendering parts of those artifacts (e.g., fold_now[] and file contents) verbatim in the generated comment, so any credential-like strings present in the repo/PR would be exposed by the LLM output.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Outside-authored free text from a user/PR is ingested into Wave 3: each panelist task prompt includes the PR number, title, body, and full diff (passed inline) plus the in-scope spec artifact, so attacker-controlled PR body/comments can be used to poison panelist/synthesizer outputs at runtime.
- Repository
- microsoft/apm
- Commit
e38261c
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.