autopilot-pr-merge-worker
Drive ONE already selected open pull request in microsoft/apm to mergeable. Classifies copilot-pull-request-reviewer[bot] inline review, runs autopilot-pr-review-worker, folds (by default) every recommendation inside the PR's stated scope, pushes to the head branch or a superseding PR that preserves authorship via commit trailers, watches CI to green (`agent-merge` when that skill or `<agent_merge_state>` is present; otherwise `gh pr checks --watch`), and iterates under fixed caps until ready-to-merge, advisory-with-deferred, superseded, or blocked. Plan before any fold, push, or reviewer request. Never spawned by autopilot-pr-review-scheduler. That scheduler is advisory only. Invoke this skill by name when the caller asked to drive a PR to merge.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The workflow reads Copilot inline reviews and PR comments authored by external users via GitHub API calls in assets/copilot-classification-prompt.md and assets/worker-prompt.md.
- Repository
microsoft/apm
- Revision
0495ced
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.