batch-bug-shepherd
Use this skill to drive a batch of suspected bugs in microsoft/apm from raw issue list to mergeable PR queue. Fan out one triage subagent per issue (LEGIT / UNCLEAR / FIXED-AT-HEAD), gate every legit bug against PRINCIPLES.md via an apm-ceo strategic-alignment pass, cross-reference legit issues against open PRs, then open a fix PR (TDD + mutation-break gate) for greenfield bugs. Drive every PR -- community in-flight and own fix alike -- to mergeable by composing the shepherd-driver skill: one driver per PR runs the review panel, folds non-blocking recommendations, pushes (preserving author), and watches CI to green. Re-probe mergeability and resolve conflicts via shepherd-driver. Maintain a plan.md ground-truth table as canonical state. Activate when the maintainer asks to triage issues, sweep the bug queue, shepherd bug-flagged issues, run a weekly community sweep, or drive in-flight community PRs to merge -- even if "shepherd" or "batch" is not named.
73
92%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Outsider-authored free text flows into the LLM context via the triage subagent input `ISSUE_BODY_OR_REPRO` (issue title/body supplied by external GitHub issues) read at Phase 1 spawn time and used in `assets/triage-prompt.md` (and then further in Phase 1.5 as `issue_body`), creating an indirect prompt-injection surface.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly probes the host repo via GitHub API calls such as `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/contents/.apm/agents/apm-ceo.agent.md` and `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/contents/PRINCIPLES.md` at runtime to fetch persona and PRINCIPLES.md content which are required and directly control the strategic-alignment subagent's prompt/decision, so this is a runtime external dependency that influences agent behavior.
- Repository
- microsoft/apm
- Commit
634f7b6
- Audited
- Security analysis
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