Use only as the composed drive-to-merge stage of an APM batch orchestrator (batch-bug-shepherd, apm-issue-autopilot) that has already selected ONE open pull request in microsoft/apm. Do NOT use for user-facing requests to triage issues, sweep a queue, or open PRs -- the parent orchestrator owns those. Spawn one shepherd-driver subagent per PR: it classifies copilot-pull-request-reviewer[bot] inline review, runs the apm-review-panel, folds (by default) every recommendation inside the PR's stated scope, pushes to the head branch or a superseding PR that preserves authorship via commit trailers, watches CI to green, and iterates under fixed caps until ready-to-merge, advisory-with-deferred, superseded, or blocked. Also provides the cross-PR conflict-resolution and mergeability-gate phase. This is NOT a standalone entrypoint.
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow fetches and then injects outsider-authored PR content—specifically Copilot review bodies/comments from GitHub (non-user-authored text) and the PR context they describe—into the shepherd-driver’s LLM steps via `assets/copilot-classification-prompt.md` (used at runtime by `assets/shepherd-driver-prompt.md` Phase X.0 classification).
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