Install and configure ToolUniverse for any use case — MCP server (chat-based), CLI (command line with 9 subcommands), or Python SDK (Coding API with 3 calling patterns). Covers uv/uvx setup, MCP configuration for 12+ AI clients (Cursor, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Trae, Cline, etc.), full CLI reference (tu list/grep/find/info/run/test/status/build/serve), Coding API quickstart, agentic tools, code executor, API key walkthrough, skill installation, and upgrading. Use when user asks how to set up ToolUniverse, which access mode to use (MCP vs CLI vs SDK), configuring MCP servers, using the CLI, troubleshooting installation, upgrading, or mentions installing ToolUniverse or setting up scientific tools. Also triggers for "how do I use ToolUniverse", "what's the best way to access tools", "command line", "tu command", "coding API", "tu build".
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
These URLs point to remote install scripts (astral.sh/uv/install.sh and astral.sh/uv/install.ps1) that the skill instructs users to execute directly (curl | sh / irm | iex), which is a high-risk pattern because running unknown remote scripts can deliver malware if the source is compromised or untrusted.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill instructs the agent to ask users for API keys and then add them verbatim into configs or shell commands (env JSON, export/echo, .env), which requires the LLM to handle and output secret values directly.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
SKILL.md defines the runtime router “tooluniverse” that uses the user’s first free-text message (“Detect language from user's first message”) and then triggers tool selection/search/summarization based on that text.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill contains explicit runtime fetch-and-execute steps and remote-install instructions—e.g., curl | sh to https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh and PowerShell irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1, a git clone of https://github.com/mims-harvard/ToolUniverse.git to install runnable skills, and an instruction to "Read https://aiscientist.tools/setup.md" which directs another agent to follow external instructions—these URLs are used at setup/runtime to fetch code or instructions that control agent behavior.
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