How to delegate work to another AI agent (Pi, Codex, Claude Code, Hermes) — picking the right agent, sending prompts to TUI agents, polling progress. Read BEFORE any `cmux send`/`tmux send-keys` to an agent, or whenever delegating, relaying, spawning, or orchestrating agent-to-agent work.
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
2 findings — 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The document contains explicit instructions to disable or bypass agent safety/permission controls (e.g., "codex --yolo" and "permission-mode bypassPermissions"), which suggests an intent to enable unauthorized or unsafe agent behavior and creates a high risk of misuse.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly recommends launching agents with permissive flags (e.g., "codex --yolo") and `claude --print --permission-mode bypassPermissions`, which instructs bypassing permission/security mechanisms and therefore encourages compromising the host's security state.
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If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.