vibe
Authoritative reference for Mistral Vibe — the CLI agent you (the model) are running inside. LOAD when the user: - asks anything about Vibe itself, even by indirect name ("this CLI", "this tool", "you"); - wants to change, inspect, or reset their setup; - asks why the agent did or did not act; - asks how to make the CLI do X, where X lives, or what a flag/command/setting does; - asks any meta question about your own behavior; - is unsure whether a command, flag, env var, or file is in scope — this skill is the source of truth. SCOPE: config under `~/.vibe/` and project-local `.vibe/`; `VIBE_*` and `LOG_*` env vars; models and providers; agents and subagents; skills; tools and their permission model; every slash command and CLI flag; hooks; MCP servers; connectors; plugins; trusted folders; `@`-file mentions; logs; themes; voice.
83%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The skill instructs the agent to fetch the README from GitHub via a static URL, which is a low-risk user-selected or documentation-fetching path.
- Repository
mistralai/mistral-vibe
- Revision
c96a6db
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
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