review-loop
Bounded review-apply-resolve convergence loop for a GitHub PR, drafts included. Runs up to N=5 iterations of pr-reviewer → implement-suggestion (--resolve-all) → polish simplify, converging until every review thread is resolved through a fix OR a reply, so the PR ends with zero open threads and only genuine human-judgment flags left open. Convergence also means CI is not red: each push is check-read and a red mechanical failure delegated to ci-auto-fix (--no-ci). On convergence it refreshes the PR description (--no-refresh) and, on a UI PR, runs ui-verify against the live preview once, report-only (--no-preview-run). When the last review still stands (unmoved head, open unreplied threads), iteration 1 applies before re-reviewing. --merge squash-merges on a clean convergence, an approving verdict, and green CI. Run it at the TOP LEVEL of a session holding a sub-agent dispatch tool, never nested in a sub-agent. Use after opening a draft PR to converge it before undrafting. Triggers on "/review-loop".
61
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tessl review fix ./skills/quality/review-loop/SKILL.mdW011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The workflow monitors and consumes GitHub pull request review threads via `gh api graphql` and dispatches external reviewers on PRs, which ingest outsider-submitted comments and review feedback.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill contains an explicit remote URL pointing to raw.githubusercontent.com used during setup/runtime to download and execute an installation script (scripts/agent0-setup.sh) which is considered a weak/unknown/suspicious source or ordinary third-party domain without enforced cryptographic verification.
- Repository
- mthines/agent-skills
- Commit
39b3f44
- Audited
- Security analysis
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