CtrlK
BlogDocsLog inGet started
Tessl Logo
SkillPublic

conducting-cloud-incident-response

Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure. Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services.

Quality

76%

Does it follow best practices?

Run evals on this skill

Adds up to 20 points to the overall score

View guide
SecuritybySnyk

Passed

No findings from the security scan

Fix and improve this skill with Tessl

tessl review fix ./skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Quality

Content

53%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.

The body is well-structured and highly actionable for AWS and Azure, with concrete commands and realistic attack patterns, but it has two structural flaws: no validation checkpoints around destructive containment/eradication steps, and a broken progressive-disclosure design in which the bundled automation script and API reference are never mentioned. GCP coverage is notably thinner than the other two clouds.

Suggestions

Reference the existing bundle files from the body — e.g., add an 'Automation' section pointing to [scripts/agent.py](scripts/agent.py) and [references/api-reference.md](references/api-reference.md) — so the automation capability is discoverable at all.

Add explicit validation checkpoints around destructive and batch operations (e.g., after containment, list all access keys and IAM users to confirm no attacker persistence remains; verify all unauthorized instances across every region are terminated before moving to eradication).

Trim or relocate the Key Concepts table (definitions of CloudTrail, Service Principal, SCP, IMDS are things Claude already knows) into references/, and add gcloud commands for GCP containment to reach parity with the AWS and Azure sections.

DimensionReasoningScore

Conciseness

The body is dominated by concrete, non-padded material (CLI commands, indicator lists, workflow steps), but includes unnecessary explanation: the Key Concepts table defines concepts Claude already knows ('CloudTrail | AWS service logging all API calls...', 'Service Principal | Non-human identity in Azure AD...', SCP, IMDS), and the 40-line example report template and duplicated scenario narration could be tightened. This fits 'mostly efficient but includes some unnecessary explanation or could be tightened' rather than anchor 4's 'minor instances', since an entire section is given to known-concept definitions.

3 / 5

Actionability

The content provides mostly executable guidance: copy-paste AWS CLI containment commands ('aws iam update-access-key ... --status Inactive'), Azure PowerShell cmdlets, and a concrete CloudTrail lookup-events/jq pipeline. It falls short of anchor 5 because GCP has no executable commands at all — GCP containment and evidence collection are prose bullets only, a real gap for a tri-cloud skill.

4 / 5

Workflow Clarity

The six steps (Detect and Confirm → Contain → Preserve Evidence → Investigate → Eradicate and Recover → Harden) are clearly sequenced, and Step 1 'Detect and Confirm' provides upfront validation. However, the workflow includes destructive and batch operations (terminating unauthorized instances, removing backdoor IAM users) with no explicit post-action validation checkpoints or feedback loops — e.g., never verifying containment succeeded or that no additional attacker-created keys remain — so per the rubric cap for destructive/batch operations without validation, workflow clarity is capped at 3.

3 / 5

Progressive Disclosure

The bundle contains scripts/agent.py (a full AWS IR automation script) and references/api-reference.md, yet neither file is referenced anywhere in the 289-line body — the references are not merely unclearly signaled but entirely undiscoverable. Meanwhile, substantial content that belongs in those files is inlined (per-cloud indicator lists, the 40-line output report template, the tools catalog). This matches the anchor for minimal cross-file structure with inlined content and buried references; it does not fit anchor 3's example of a reference being present-but-poorly-placed.

2 / 5

Total

12

/

20

Passed

Description

88%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Based on the skill's description, can an agent find and select it at the right time? Clear, specific descriptions lead to better discovery.

A strong description: it states concrete capabilities with named services and includes an explicit, well-phrased 'Use when...' trigger clause covering the main incident scenarios. The only weaknesses are a few missing natural trigger variations and slight overlap risk with generic IR skills.

DimensionReasoningScore

Specificity

The description lists four concrete action areas — 'identity-based containment', 'cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs)', 'resource isolation', and 'forensic evidence acquisition' — each grounded with named services. This matches the anchor for multiple specific concrete actions with comprehensive coverage, not the anchor 4 example where coverage has minor gaps, since the listed actions span the skill's core IR scope.

5 / 5

Completeness

It explicitly answers both: what ('Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis..., resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition') and when ('Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services'). This matches the anchor with clear, explicit what AND when with concrete trigger phrases; the score-4 anchor's weaker/less-explicit 'when' does not apply.

5 / 5

Trigger Term Quality

Natural trigger phrases are present — 'CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services' — plus provider names (AWS, Azure, GCP) and log service names. A few natural user variations are missing (e.g., 'compromised account', detection-tool alerts like GuardDuty), so it falls at good-but-not-comprehensive keyword coverage rather than the comprehensive anchor 5.

4 / 5

Distinctiveness Conflict Risk

The cloud-specific scoping (three CSPs, named log services, CSPM/credential-exposure triggers) carves a clear niche with mostly distinct triggers. However, generic phrases like 'security incidents' and 'a breach spanning cloud services' create minor overlap risk with a general enterprise incident-response skill, fitting the 'mostly distinct; minor overlap risk' anchor rather than the minimal-conflict anchor 5.

4 / 5

Total

18

/

20

Passed

Validation

93%

Checks the skill against the spec for correct structure and formatting. All validation checks must pass before discovery and implementation can be scored.

Validation — 15 / 16 Passed

Validation for skill structure

CriteriaDescriptionResult

frontmatter_unknown_keys

Unknown frontmatter key(s) found; consider removing or moving to metadata

Warning

Total

15

/

16

Passed

Repository

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Path

skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md

Reviewed

Table of Contents

Is this your skill?

If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.