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conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync

Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket forging, typically with Mimikatz. Use in authorized engagements after finding principals with replication rights, to establish long-term domain persistence, or to validate detections for replication abuse.

Quality

80%

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SecuritybySnyk

Passed

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tessl review fix ./skills/conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Quality

Content

65%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.

The body's core strength is highly actionable, copy-paste-ready tooling across a clearly phased attack workflow. Its weaknesses are padded background sections that duplicate reference files, missing inline validation/feedback loops in a batch credential-dumping workflow, and a bundle whose references, scripts, and template are never linked from the body.

Suggestions

Trim the Overview's background (inventor attribution and APT group list already live in references/standards.md) and replace the circular "When to Use" bullet with concrete engagement triggers.

Add inline validation checkpoints between phases with fix-and-retry guidance, e.g. verify the extracted KRBTGT hash by forging a test ticket and confirming DA access with klist or an authenticated LDAP bind before proceeding to persistence.

Link the existing bundle files from the relevant sections — references/workflows.md for the attack chain, references/api-reference.md for GUIDs and event IDs, scripts/agent.py and scripts/process.py for enumeration/auditing, and assets/template.md for evidence documentation — instead of duplicating their content inline.

DimensionReasoningScore

Conciseness

The workflow core is lean, but the Overview re-explains DCSync background Claude already knows (Delpy/Le Toux attribution, APT28/APT29/FIN6 naming — duplicated in references/standards.md), the "When to Use" bullet is circular ("security assessments that involve conducting domain persistence with dcsync"), and the MITRE ATT&CK Mapping section duplicates the frontmatter and standards.md. Mostly efficient with some unnecessary explanation, fitting the 3 anchor rather than 2 since the majority of the body is tight commands and tables.

3 / 5

Actionability

Copy-paste ready commands throughout: PowerView ACL enumeration, a BloodHound cypher query, mimikatz lsadump::dcsync variants, secretsdump.py (krbtgt-only, NTLM-only, Kerberos auth), ticketer.py, Add-DomainObjectAcl, and ntlmrelayx.py, with the common cases covered; placeholders like <krbtgt_ntlm_hash> and domain SIDs are runtime values. Fully matches the 5 anchor.

5 / 5

Workflow Clarity

Four clearly sequenced phases with one inline verify step ("Verify rights were added") and a terminal Validation Criteria checklist, but no validate→fix→retry feedback loops between phases (e.g., no check that the extracted KRBTGT hash is usable before forging a ticket). Since dumping /all domain hashes is a batch operation and granting DCSync rights modifies the domain ACL, the rubric's cap for batch/destructive workflows without validation applies, holding this at the 3 anchor rather than 4.

3 / 5

Progressive Disclosure

The bundle contains references/api-reference.md, references/standards.md, references/workflows.md, scripts/agent.py, scripts/process.py, and assets/template.md, yet the body references none of them. Meanwhile MITRE mappings and detection GUIDs are inlined while also living in the reference files, and the Python scripts go unmentioned despite a "Python 3.8+" prerequisite. Body section structure is good but the references are orphaned and duplicated content is inline, matching the 3 anchor rather than 4.

3 / 5

Total

14

/

20

Passed

Description

88%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Based on the skill's description, can an agent find and select it at the right time? Clear, specific descriptions lead to better discovery.

A strong description: it states concrete capabilities in third person with named techniques, accounts, and tools, and explicitly answers both what it does and when to use it with actionable triggers. The only gaps are a few missing natural synonyms (hash dumping, credential dumping, Active Directory, secretsdump/impacket) and minor overlap risk with sibling AD persistence skills.

DimensionReasoningScore

Specificity

"Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket forging" lists multiple concrete actions with named protocol rights and target accounts. Coverage of the technique's actions is comprehensive, fitting the 5 anchor rather than 4, and the voice is third person.

5 / 5

Completeness

The "what" is explicit (replication-rights abuse to extract KRBTGT/DA/service hashes and forge Golden Tickets) and the "when" is explicit with concrete triggers ("Use in authorized engagements after finding principals with replication rights, to establish long-term domain persistence, or to validate detections for replication abuse"), matching the 5 anchor exactly.

5 / 5

Trigger Term Quality

Natural terms include DCSync, Golden Ticket, Mimikatz, KRBTGT, Domain Admin, replication rights, and domain persistence. A few natural phrasings users would say are missing ("dump hashes", "credential dumping", "Active Directory", secretsdump/impacket), matching the 4 anchor rather than 5's synonym-level comprehensiveness.

4 / 5

Distinctiveness Conflict Risk

DCSync is a clear niche with distinct replication-rights triggers, but "Golden Ticket forging" and "domain persistence" overlap with closely related AD attack skills (e.g., a standalone golden-ticket or credential-dumping skill), matching the 4 anchor rather than 5's minimal-conflict bar.

4 / 5

Total

18

/

20

Passed

Validation

93%

Checks the skill against the spec for correct structure and formatting. All validation checks must pass before discovery and implementation can be scored.

Validation — 15 / 16 Passed

Validation for skill structure

CriteriaDescriptionResult

frontmatter_unknown_keys

Unknown frontmatter key(s) found; consider removing or moving to metadata

Warning

Total

15

/

16

Passed

Repository

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Path

skills/conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync/SKILL.md

Reviewed

Table of Contents

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