Respond to phishing incidents by analyzing reported emails, extracting indicators, sandboxing URLs/attachments, assessing credential compromise, quarantining malicious messages organization-wide, and remediating affected accounts. Use when investigating a reported phishing or credential-phishing email, a suspected spearphishing incident, or when a mailbox-wide purge and account remediation is needed.
81%
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Do not use for business email compromise (BEC) involving compromised internal accounts; use BEC response procedures which focus on account takeover investigation.
Evaluate the reported email to determine if it is malicious:
Email Header Analysis Checklist:
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Return-Path: billing@spoofed-domain[.]com
From: "IT Support" <support@corp-lookalike[.]com>
Reply-To: attacker@gmail[.]com (different from From)
SPF: FAIL (sender IP not authorized for domain)
DKIM: FAIL (signature invalid)
DMARC: FAIL (policy: none - no enforcement)
Received: from mail.attacker-infra[.]net [45.33.x.x]
X-Originating-IP: 45.33.x.x
Message-ID: <random@attacker-infra.net>Classification criteria:
Examine URLs and attachments in a safe environment:
URL Analysis:
Attachment Analysis:
Identify all recipients and assess who interacted with the phishing email:
Scope Assessment:
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Total Recipients: 47 users
Delivered to Inbox: 38 users (9 caught by email gateway)
Opened Email: 24 users (email tracking pixel data)
Clicked Link: 8 users (proxy/firewall logs)
Entered Credentials: 3 users (phishing page submitted form data)
Opened Attachment: 2 users (EDR process execution telemetry)Search methods:
Execute containment actions based on impact assessment:
Email Containment:
Account Containment (for users who entered credentials):
# Microsoft 365: Revoke sessions and reset password
Connect-AzureAD
Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken -ObjectId "user@corp.com"
Set-AzureADUserPassword -ObjectId "user@corp.com" -ForceChangePasswordNextLogin $true
# Check for mailbox forwarding rules
Get-InboxRule -Mailbox "user@corp.com" | Where-Object {$_.ForwardTo -or $_.RedirectTo}
# Remove suspicious forwarding rules
Remove-InboxRule -Mailbox "user@corp.com" -Identity "Rule Name"Remove all traces of the phishing attack:
Strengthen defenses against similar phishing attacks:
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Spear Phishing | Targeted phishing attack crafted for a specific individual or organization using personalized content |
| Credential Harvesting | Phishing technique that mimics a legitimate login page to capture usernames and passwords |
| SPF (Sender Policy Framework) | Email authentication protocol that specifies which mail servers are authorized to send email for a domain |
| DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) | Email authentication method using cryptographic signatures to verify that an email was not altered in transit |
| DMARC | Policy framework that uses SPF and DKIM to determine email authenticity and instructs receivers on handling failures |
| OAuth Consent Phishing | Attack that tricks users into granting malicious OAuth applications access to their email and data |
| Email Header | Metadata embedded in every email containing routing, authentication, and sender information used for forensic analysis |
Context: Users report an email claiming to be from IT requiring MFA re-enrollment. The email contains a QR code that links to a convincing Microsoft 365 login page clone hosted on a compromised WordPress site.
Approach:
Pitfalls:
PHISHING INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT
===================================
Incident: INC-2025-1602
Date Reported: 2025-11-16T09:15:00Z
Reported By: jdoe@corp.example.com
Classification: Credential Phishing (AiTM)
EMAIL ANALYSIS
Subject: "Action Required: MFA Re-enrollment"
Sender: it-support@corp-security[.]com (spoofed)
SPF: FAIL | DKIM: FAIL | DMARC: FAIL
Phishing URL: hxxps://compromised-site[.]com/ms365/login
Phishing Type: Microsoft 365 AiTM credential harvester
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Recipients: 47
Clicked Link: 8
Credentials Entered: 3 (confirmed via proxy POST data)
CONTAINMENT ACTIONS
[x] Email purged from all 47 mailboxes
[x] Phishing domain blocked at web proxy
[x] Sender domain blocked at email gateway
[x] 3 compromised accounts: passwords reset, sessions revoked
[x] Mailbox forwarding rules reviewed (1 malicious rule removed)
[x] OAuth app grants reviewed (no unauthorized grants found)
IOCs EXTRACTED
Domain: corp-security[.]com
URL: hxxps://compromised-site[.]com/ms365/login
IP: 104.21.x.x (Cloudflare-hosted)
Sender: it-support@corp-security[.]com
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Implement DMARC enforcement (p=reject) for corp domain
2. Deploy QR code scanning in email gateway
3. Send targeted awareness notification to all 47 recipients
4. Request domain takedown via registrar abuse contactmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
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